Pakistan is a paradigm example of a failed state that has undergone an extremely dangerous form of radical Islamisation.
Anglo-Sikh War
ANGLO-SIKH WAR 1, 1845-46, resulting in partial subjugation of the Sikh
kingdom, as the outcome of British expansionism. It was near-anarchical
conditions that overtook the Lahore court after the death of Maharaja Ranjit
Singh in June 1839. The English, by then firmly installed in Firozpur the Sikh
frontier, about 70 km from Lahore, the Sikh capital, were watching the
happenings across the border with more than neighbour's interest The disorder
that revealed there promised them a good opportunity for direct intervention.
Up to 1838, the British troops on the Sikh frontier had amounted to one
regiment at Sabathu in the hills and two at Ludhiana with six pieces of
artillery, equaling in all about 2,500 men. The total rose to 8,000 during the
time of Lord Auckland (1836 42) who increased the number of troops at Ludhiana
and created a new military post at Firozpur, which was actually Past of Sikh
kingdom's dominion south of the Sutlej. British preparations for a war with the
Sikhs began seriously in 1843 when the new governor-general, Lord Ellenborough
(1842-44), discussed with the Home government the possibilities of a military
occupation of the Punjab. English and Indian infantry reinforcement began
arriving at each of the frontier posts of Firozpur and Ludhiana. Cavalry and
artillery regiments moved up to Ambala and Kasauli. Works were in the process of
erection around the magazine at Firozpur, and the fort at Ludhiana began to he
fortified. Plans for the construction of bridges over the rivers Markanda and
Ghaggar were prepared, and a new road link to join Meerut and Ambala was taken
in hand. Exclusive of the newly constructed cantonments of Kasauli and Shimla,
Ellenborough had been able to collect a force of 11,639 men and 48 guns at
Ambala, Ludhiana and Firozpur. Everywhere," wrote Lord Ellenborough, we are
trying to get things in order and especially to strengthen and equip the
artillery with which the fight will be."
Seventy boats of thirty-five tons each, with the necessary equipments to
bridge the Sutlej at any point, were under construction; fifty-six pontoons were
on their way from Bombay for use in Sindh, and two steamers were being
constructed to ply on the River Sutlej. in November 1845," he informed the Duke
of Wellington, "the army will be equal to any operation. I should be sorry to
have it called to the field sooner." In July 1844, Lord Ellenborough was
replaced by Lord Hardinge (1844-48), a Peninsula veteran, as governor-general of
India. Hardinge further accelerated the process of strengthening the Sutlej
frontier for a war with the Sikhs. The abrasive and belligerent Major George
Broadfoot as the political agent on the Punjab frontier replaced the affable
Colonel Richmond. Lord Cough, the commander-in-chief, established his
headquarters at Ambala. In October 1844, the British military force on the
frontier was 17,000 infantry and 60 guns. Another 10,000 troops were to be ready
by the end of November. Firozpur's garrison strength under the command of Sir
John Littler was raised to 7,000; by January 1845, the total British force
amounted to 20,000 men and 60 guns. We can collect," Hardinge reported to the
Home government, 33,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 100 guns in six weeks." In
March, additional British and Indian regiments were quietly moved to Firozpur,
Ludhiana and Ambala. Field batteries of 9 pounders with horses or bullocks to
draw them, and 24 additional pieces of heavy ordnance were on their way to the
frontier. In addition, 600 elephants to draw the battering train of 24-pounder
batteries had reached Agra, and 7,000 camels between Kanpur and the Sutlej were
to move up in the summer to Firozpur, which was to be the concentration point
for a forward offensive movement.
Lord Hardinge, blamed unnecessarily by the Home government for inadequate
military preparations for the first Sikh war, had, during the seventeen months
between Ellen borough's departure and the commencement of hostilities with the
Sikhs, increased the garrison strength at Ferozpur from 4,596 men and 12 guns to
10,472 men and 24 guns; at Ambala from 4,113 men and 24 guns to 12, 972 men and
32 guns; at Ludhiana from 3,030 men and 12 guns to 7,235 men and 12 guns, and at
Meerut from 5,573 men and 18 guns to 9,844 men and 24 guns. The relevant
strength of the advanced armies, including those at the hill stations of Sabathu
and Kasauli, was raised from 24,000 men and 66 guns to 45,500 men and 98 guns.
These figures are based on official British papers, particularly Hardinge's
private correspondence on Punjab affairs with his predecessor, Lord Ellenborough.
Thus Total number of British troops around Punjab was 86,023 men and 116 guns.
In addition to the concentration of troops on the border, an elaborate supply
depot was set up by the British at Basslan, near Raikot, in Ludhiana district.
The Lahore Darbar's vamps or representatives and news writers in the cis-Sutlej
region sent alarming reports of these large-scale British military movements
across the border. The Sikhs were deeply wrought upon by these war preparations,
especially by Broad foot’s acts of hostility. The rapid march in November 1845
of the governor-general towards the frontier and a report of Sir Charles
Napier's speech in the Delhi Gazette saying that the British were going to war
with the Sikhs filled Lahore with rumors of invasion. The Sikh ranks, alerted to
the danger of a British offensive, started their own preparations. Yet the army
pinches or regimental representatives, who had taken over the affairs of the
Lahore forces into their own hands after the death of Wazir Jawahar Singh, were
at this time maintaining, according to George Campbell, a British civilian
employed in the cis-Sutlej territory, Memoirs of My Indian Career , "Wonderful
order at Lahore.. and almost puritanical discipline in the military republic."
However, the emergence of the army Panchayats as a new centre of power
greatly perturbed the British authority that termed it as "unholy alliance
between the republican army and the Darbar." In this process Sikh army had
indeed been transformed. It had now assumed the role of the Khalsa. It worked
through elected regimental committees declaring that Guru Gobind Singh's ideal
of the Sikh commonwealth had been revived, with the Sarbatt Khalsa or the Sikh
as a whole assuming all executive, military and civil authority in the State.
The British decried this as "the dangerous military democracy of the panchayat
system," in which soldiers were in a state of success mutiny. " When the British
agent made a reference the Lahore Darbar about military preparations in the
Punjab, it replied that there only defensive measures to counter the signs of
the British. The Darbar, on other hand, asked for the return of the estimated at
over seventeen lakh of the Lahore grandee Suchet Singh had left buried in
Firozpur, the restoration of the village of Mauran granted by Maharaja Ranjit
Singh to one of his generals Hukam Singh Malvai, but subsequently resumed by the
ruler of Nabha with the active connivance of the British, and free passage of
Punjabi armed constabulary — a right that had been acknowledged by the British
on paper but more often than not in practice. The British government rejected
the Darbar's claims and severed diplomatic relations with it. The armies under
Hugh Gough and Lord Hardinge began proceeding towards Firozpur. To forestall
their joining those at Firozpur, the Sikh army began to cross the Sutlej on 11
December near Harike Pattan into its own territory on the other side of the
river. The crossing over the Sutlej by Sikhs was made a pretext by the British
for opening hostilities and on 13 December Governor-General Lord Hardinge issued
a proclamation announcing war on the Sikhs. The declaration charged the State of
Lahore with violation of the treaty of friendship of 1809 and justified British
preparations as merely precautionary measures for the protection of the Sutlej
frontier. The British simultaneously declared Sikh possessions on the left bank
of the Sutlej forfeit.
Hesitation and indecision marred Sikh military operations. Having crossed the
Sutlej with five divisions, each 8,000 - 12,000 strong, an obvious strategy for
them would have been to move forward. They did in a bold sweeping movement first
encircle Firozpur, then held by Sir John Littler with only 7,000 men, but
withdrew without driving the advantage home and dispersed their armies in a wide
semicircle from Harike to Mudki and thence to Ferozeshah, 16 km southeast of
Firozpur. The abandonment of Firozpur as a first target was the result of the
treachery of the Sikh Prime Minister, Lal Singh, who was in treasonable
communication with Captain Peter Nicholson, the assistant political agent of the
British. He asked the latter's advice and was told not to attack Firozpur. This
instruction he followed seducing the Sikhs with an ingenious excuse that,
instead of falling upon an easy prey, the Khalsa should exalt their fame by
captivity or the death of the Lat Sahib (the governor general) himself A
division precipitately moved towards Ludhiana also remained inactive long enough
to lose the benefit of the initiative The Khalsa army had crossed the Sutlej
borne on a wave of popular enthusiasm, it was equally matched (60000 Sikh
soldiers vs. 86,000 British soldiers) if not superior to the British force. Its
soldiers had the will and determination to fight or die, but not its commanders.
There was no unique among them, and each of them seemed to act as he thought
best. Drift was the policy deliberately adopted by them. On 18 December, the
Sikhs came in touch with British army, which arrived under Sir Hugh Gough, the
commander-in-chief, from Ludhiana. A battle took place at Mudki, 32 km from
Flrozpur. Lal Singh, who headed the Sikh attack, deserted his army and fled the
field when the Sikhs stood firm in their order, fighting in a resolute and
determined manner. The leaderless Sikhs fought a grim hand-to-hand battle
against the more numerous enemy led by the most experienced commanders in the
world. The battle continued with unabated fury till midnight (and came
thereafter to be known as "Midnight Mudki"). The Sikhs retired with a loss of 17
guns while the British suffered heavy causalities amounting to 872 killed and
wounded, including Quartermaster-General Sir Robert Sale, Sir John McCaskill and
Brigadier Boulton. Reinforcements were sent for from Ambala, Meerut and Delhi.
Lord Hardinge, unmindful of his superior position of governor-general, offered
to become second-in-command to his commander-in-chief.
The second action was fought three days later, on 21 December at Ferozeshah,
16 km both from Mudki and Firozpur. The governor-general and the
commander-in-chief, assisted by reinforcements led by General Littler from
Firozpur, made an attack upon the Sikhs who were awaiting them behind strong
entrenchments. The British — 16,700 men and 69 guns—tried to overrun the Sikhs
in one massive cavalry, infantry and artillery onslaught, but the assault was
stubbornly resisted. Sikhs' batteries fired with rapidity and precision. There
was confusion in the ranks of the English and their position became increasingly
critical. The growing darkness of the frosty winter night reduced them to sore
straits. The battle of Ferozeshah is regarded as one of the most fiercely
contested battles fought by the British in India. During that "night of
horrors," the commander-in-chief acknowledged, "We were in a critical and
perilous state." Counsels of retreat and surrender were raised and despair
struck the British camp. In the words of General Sir ISope Grant, Sir Henry
Hardinge thought it was all up and gave his sword - a present from the Duke of
Wellington and which once belonged to Napoleon - and his Star of the ISath to his
son, with directions to proceed to Firozpur, remarking that "if the day were
lost, he must fall. "
Lal Singh and Tej Singh again came to the rescue of the English. The former
suddenly deserted the Khalsa army during the night and the latter the next
morning (22 December), which enabled the British to turn defeat into victory.
The British loss was again heavy, 1,560 killed and 1,721 wounded. The number of
causalities among officers was comparatively higher. The Sikhs lost about 2,000
men and 73 pieces of artillery.
A temporary cessation of hostilities followed the battle of Ferozeshah. The
English were not in a position to assume the offensive and waited for heavy guns
and reinforcements to arrive from Delhi. Lal Singh and Tej Singh allowed them
the much-needed respite in as much as they kept the Sikhs from recrossing the
Sutlej. To induce desertions, Lord Hardinge issued a proclamation on the
Christmas day inviting all natives of Hindustan to quit the service of the Sikh
State on pain of forfeiting their property and to claim protection from the
British government. The deserters were also offered liberal rewards and
pensions.
A Sikh sardar, Ranjodh Singh Majlthia, crossed the Sutlej in force and was
joined by Ajit Singh, of Ladva, from the other side of the river. They marched
towards Ludhiana and burnt a portion of the cantonment. Sir Harry Smith
(afterwards Governor of Cape Colony), who was sent to relieve Ludhlana, marched
eastwards from Firozpur, keeping a few miles away from the Sutlej. Ranjodh Singh
Majithia harried Smith's column and, when Smith tried to make a detour at
Baddoval, attacked his rear with great vigor and captured his baggage train and
stores (21 January). But Harry Smith retrieved his position a week later by
inflicting a defeat on Ranjodh Singh Majithia and Ajlt Singh, of Ladva,
(28January).
The last battle of the campaign took place on 10 February. To check the enemy
advance on Lahore, a large portion of the Sikh army was entrenched in a
horseshoe curve on the Sutlej near the village of Sabhraon, under the command of
Tej Singh while the cavalry battalions and the dreaded ghorcharas under Lal
Singh were a little higher up the river. Entrenchments at Sabhraon were on the
left bank of the Sutlej with a pontoon bridge connecting them with their base
camp. Their big guns were placed behind high embankments and consequently
immobilized for offensive action. The infantry was also posted behind earthworks
and could not, therefore, be deployed to harass the opponents.
Early in February, the British received ample stores of ammunition from
Delhi. Lal Singh had already passed on to the English officers the required
clues for an effective assault. Gough and Hardinge now decided to make a frontal
attack on Sabhraon and destroy the Darbar army at one blow. A heavy mist hung
over the battlefield, enveloping both contending armies. As the sun broke
through the mist, the Sikhs found themselves encircled between two horseshoes:
facing them were the British and behind them was the Sutlej, now in spate. After
a preliminary artillery duel, British cavalry made a feint to check on the exact
location of the Sikh guns. The cannonade was resumed, and in two hours British
guns put the Darbar artillery out of action. Then the British charged Sikh
entrenchments from three sides. Tej Singh fled across the pontoon bridge as soon
as the contest started and had it destroyed making reinforcement or return of
Sikh soldiers impossible. Gulab Singh Dogra stopped sending supplies and rations
from Lahore. Lal Singh's ghorcharas did not put in their appearance at Sabhraon.
In the midst of these treacheries, a Sikh warrior, Sham Singh Attarivala,
symbolizing the unflinching will of the Khalsa, vowed to fight unto the last and
fall in battle rather than retire in defeat. He rallied the ranks depleted by
desertions. His courage inspired the Sikhs to make a determined bid to save the
day, but the odds were against them. Sham Singh fell fighting in the foremost
ranks along with his dauntless comrades. The British casualties at Sabhraon were
2,403 killed; the Sikhs lost 3,125 men in the action and all their guns were
either captured or abandoned in the river. Captain J.D. Cunningham, who was
present as an additional aide-de-camp to the governor-general, describes the
last scene of the battle vividly in his A History of the Sikhs: "...although
assailed on either side by squadrons of horse and battalions of foot, no Sikh
offered to submit, and no disciple of Guru Gobind Singh asked for quarter. They
everywhere showed a front to the victors, and stalked slowly and sullenly away,
while many rushed singly forth to meet assured death by contending with a
multitude. The victors looked with stolid wonderment upon the indomitable
courage of the vanquished.... "
Lord Hugh Gough, the British commander-in-chief, under whose leadership the
two Anglo-Sikh wars were fought, described Sabhraon as the Waterloo of India.
Paying tribute to the gallantry of the Sikhs, he said: "Policy precluded me
publicly recording my sentiments on the splendid gallantry of our fallen foe, or
to record the acts of heroism displayed, not only individually, but almost
collectively, by the Sikh sardars and the army; and I declare were it not from a
deep conviction that my country's good required the sacrifice, I could have wept
to have witnessed the fearful slaughter of so devoted a body of men."
Lord Hardinge, who saw the action, wrote: " Few escaped; none, it may be
said, surrendered. The Sikhs met their fate with the resignation, which
distinguishes their race.
Two days after their victory at Sabhraon, British forces crossed the Sutlej
and occupied Kasur. The Lahore Darbar empowered Gulab Singh Dogra, who had
earlier come down to Lahore with regiments of hillmen, to negotiate a treaty of
peace. The wily Gulab Singh first obtained assurances from the army Parishes
that they would agree to the terms he made and then tendered the submission of
the darbar to Lord Hardinge. The governor-general, realizing that the Sikhs were
far from vanquished, forbore from immediate occupation of the country. By the
terms imposed by the victorious British through the peace treaty of 9 March, the
Lahore Darbar was compelled to give up Jalandhar Doab, pay a war indemnity
amounting to a million and a half sterling, reduce its army to 20,000 infantry
and 12,000 cavalry, hand over all the guns used in the war and relinquish
control of both banks of the Sutlej to the British. A further condition was
added two days later on 11 March: the posting of a British unit in Lahore till
the end of the year on payment of expenses. The Darbar was unable to pay the
full war indemnity and ceded in lieu thereof the hill territories between the
Beas and the Indus. Kashmir was sold to Gulab Singh Dogra for 75 lakh rupees. A
week later, on 16 March, another treaty was signed at Amritsar recognizing him
as Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, affirming the suspicion that Gulab Singh Dogra
indeed was involved in sedition against Khalsa Sarkar. Although Maharani Jind
Kaur continued to act as the regent and Raja Lal Singh as water of the minor
Maharaja Duleep Singh, effective power had passed into the hands of the British
resident, Colonel Henry Lawrence. And thus ended the First Anglo-Sikh war.
